Justia Lawyer Rating
Expertise
Super Lawyers

Image-Law-300x300In State v. Juan C. Hernandez-Peralta (decided July 22, 2025), the New Jersey Supreme Court answered a practical question that comes up all the time in criminal practice: how far does a defense lawyer have to go to investigate a client’s immigration status? The Court held that, on the facts of this case, sentencing counsel was not constitutionally ineffective for asking, “Are you a U.S. citizen?”, getting a clear “yes”, and relying on that answer, even though the client later turned out to be a noncitizen who faced deportation.

The underlying case started with a series of burglaries and a robbery in Lakewood in 2019. Hernandez-Peralta pled guilty to three counts of third-degree burglary and one count of second-degree robbery. At his plea hearing, he told the judge he was a U.S. citizen and said he was born in New York. On the standard New Jersey plea form, he also answered that he was a citizen. Despite that answer, his plea lawyer still went through the immigration questions and warned him that if he was not a citizen, his guilty plea could lead to removal from the United States and block him from legally re-entering.

The presentence report, however, told a slightly different story. It listed his place of birth as Mexico, noted that he came to New York as a young child. The report also left several fields blank, including “Alien Status” and “Citizenship.” At sentencing, a different public defender represented him. She had the presentence report, reviewed it with him, and asked him directly if he was a U.S. citizen. Once again, he said yes. She did not independently investigate his status, obtain immigration records, or give case-specific immigration advice. The negotiated sentence, Recovery Court probation with a backup NERA prison term, was imposed.

Image-3-200x300The New Jersey Supreme Court has continued to reinforce the strength of our State Constitution’s warrant protections in its recent decision, State v. Fenimore. The Court unanimously held that the automobile exception does not permit police to conduct a warrantless search of a vehicle once law enforcement has full control over the car, its occupants, and the surrounding environment. In Fenimore, the defendant had been arrested for DWI inside a State Police barracks, the passenger had been removed, officers had possession of the keys, and the vehicle was required to be held for a mandatory twelve-hour impound period under John’s Law. Despite these circumstances, where mobility, safety concerns, and the risk of evidence destruction were completely neutralized, the State Police searched the car in the station parking lot without obtaining a warrant.

At the suppression hearing, a crucial detail emerged: because this was a DWI arrest, John’s Law required that the car be impounded for at least twelve hours, and the trooper openly admitted the vehicle was not going anywhere. That admission gutted the State’s claim that this was the kind of mobile, rapidly unfolding situation that justifies the automobile exception. The State tried to save the search by pointing to hypothetical risks of third-party tampering and by characterizing the barracks parking lot as effectively still “on scene,” but the Supreme Court rejected the idea that speculative fears can create exigency where police already have full control over the car, its occupants, and the keys.

Relying on State v. Witt, the Court reiterated that New Jersey’s automobile exception is intentionally narrow and applies only to true on-scene situations involving spontaneous probable cause and real-time exigency. The search in Fenimore occurred in a controlled environment where any urgency had been neutralized: the driver was in custody, the passenger removed, the keys seized, and the car subject to mandatory impound. Under those facts, the Court held that the police were constitutionally required to seek judicial approval before searching. With no valid exception to the warrant requirement, the search violated the New Jersey Constitution, and the Court ordered suppression of the evidence.

Image-1-300x300The New Jersey Supreme Court recently issued a major ruling that reshapes how courts and prosecutors must apply the state’s strict Graves Act sentencing rules for gun offenses. In State v. Zaire J. Cromedy (decided August 5, 2025), the Court unanimously held that a conviction under N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(j), which makes it a first-degree crime for someone with a prior No Early Release Act (NERA) conviction to unlawfully possess a weapon, is not automatically subject to the Graves Act’s mandatory parole-ineligibility period.

The case began when police arrested Zaire Cromedy in 2021 and found a handgun in his possession. Because Cromedy had a prior reckless manslaughter conviction covered by NERA, prosecutors charged him under subsection (j) of the unlawful possession statute. He pled guilty to first-degree unlawful possession of a weapon, and the trial court imposed a ten-year sentence with five years of parole ineligibility under the Graves Act. The Appellate Division affirmed, reasoning that subsection (j) simply upgraded the degree of the underlying offense and therefore carried the same mandatory minimum sentence.

The Supreme Court disagreed. Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Noriega explained that subsection (j) creates a separate, standalone first-degree crime rather than a sentencing enhancement. The Court emphasized that the Graves Act explicitly lists which offenses trigger mandatory minimums—namely subsections (a), (b), (c), and (f) of the weapons statute—but not subsection (j). Because the Legislature added subsection (j) in 2013 yet chose not to include it in the Graves Act at that time, the Court concluded it would be improper to read that requirement into the law. In plain terms, the justices ruled that subsection (j) carries its own penalty range of ten to twenty years in prison, but without the automatic five-year no-parole term unless the sentencing judge imposes one based on the specific facts of the case.

Hudson-County-Criminal-Lawyer-Witness-Statement-300x199The Supreme Court of New Jersey’s decision in State v. Isaiah J. Knight offers a nuanced examination of the limits of reciprocal discovery in criminal cases, particularly focusing on the circumstances surrounding an affidavit recanting a witness’s previous identification of the defendant as the perpetrator of a crime. The facts of this case play a crucial role in understanding the Court’s rationale and its implications for criminal defense.

On June 1, 2021, Tyzier White was fatally shot outside the Neptune Lounge in Newark. Two witnesses, known by the nicknames “Zay” and “DJ Neptune,” identified Isaiah Knight as the shooter based on sworn statements and photo arrays. Subsequently, Isaiah Knight was arrested. However, in December 2021, Zay reported being coerced into recanting his original statement through a written affidavit while being held at gunpoint by individuals, including the defendant’s sister and cousin. This affidavit aimed to exonerate Knight by claiming Zay’s initial identification was made under duress from detectives.

The State sought to obtain this recanting affidavit from the defense, asserting that it constituted physical evidence of crimes (witness tampering and kidnapping) related to the initial murder charge. The defense objected, invoking constitutional protections to resist disclosing the affidavit. Nonetheless, the trial court and later the Appellate Division ruled in favor of the State, compelling the disclosure of the affidavit under the reciprocal discovery rules.

jersey-city-criminal-lawyer-eyewitness-misidentification-defense-300x200

In a landmark decision that underscores the evolving landscape of criminal law, the New Jersey Supreme Court in State v. Brandon M. Washington set forth new guidelines aimed at enhancing the reliability of eyewitness identification, a pivotal issue in criminal defense, especially in jurisdictions like Jersey City. The ruling reflects a nuanced understanding of the psychological underpinnings of eyewitness memory and its vulnerability to suggestion, emphasizing the need for stringent controls over the identification process.

At the heart of the decision is the acknowledgment of the significant impact misidentifications can have on the accused, the victim, and the integrity of the justice system. The Supreme Court’s directive mandates more rigorous procedures for conducting eyewitness identifications, including the recording of such sessions, to ensure transparency and accountability. This decision builds upon the Court’s prior efforts to mitigate the risks associated with eyewitness testimony, which has historically been a contentious point in criminal trials.

For criminal lawyers in Jersey City, this ruling offers a dual opportunity: to advocate for fairer, more reliable identification processes and to challenge identifications that fail to meet the new standards. It necessitates a deeper engagement with the science of memory and the factors that influence recall, equipping defense attorneys with a robust framework to scrutinize eyewitness evidence presented against their clients.

Jersey City Criminal LawyerIn a landmark decision, the New Jersey Supreme Court provided critical insights into the state’s witness tampering statute through the case of State v. William Hill. This case scrutinized the boundaries of lawful communication and witness intimidation, posing significant implications for criminal defense strategies.

The core of the dispute revolved around William Hill, who faced charges of first-degree carjacking. While awaiting trial, Hill sent a letter to the victim, asserting his innocence and urging the victim to “tell the truth” if unsure about his identity as the perpetrator. This act led to additional charges of third-degree witness tampering, sparking a legal debate over the constitutionality of New Jersey’s witness tampering statute, N.J.S.A. 2C:28-5(a).

The Supreme Court’s analysis clarified that while the statute is not overbroad on its face, its application in Hill’s case raised constitutional concerns. The court highlighted the nuanced distinction between permissible advocacy and unlawful witness tampering. Specifically, it underscored the necessity for the state to demonstrate that such communications were intended to cause a witness to testify falsely or otherwise obstruct justice, which was not sufficiently established in Hill’s case.

Hudson-County-Criminal-Lawyer-Abandoned-Property-300x169The Supreme Court of New Jersey’s decision in the case of State v. Curtis L. Gartrell presents a significant analysis of property rights and the Fourth Amendment’s protections against unreasonable searches and seizures. In this case, the court examined the concept of abandonment in the context of a police chase, where the defendant fled and left behind a suitcase containing illegal substances. By abandoning the suitcase, Gartrell relinquished any privacy interest he had in the item, thereby negating his ability to challenge the police’s warrantless search of the suitcase.

The decision underscores a critical point for both legal professionals and the general public: the act of abandoning property, especially during a police encounter, can have profound implications on one’s constitutional rights. The court’s analysis provides a nuanced understanding of how actions taken in the heat of the moment can lead to the forfeiture of rights to privacy and the protection against unwarranted governmental intrusion.

This case is a stark reminder of the legal complexities surrounding searches and seizures, and it serves as a crucial point of discussion for those interested in criminal law and constitutional rights. It also highlights the judiciary’s role in interpreting and applying legal principles to specific factual contexts, offering valuable insights into the balance between law enforcement interests and individual rights.

Summary

Cell tower evidence lawyer

Cell tower evidence is frequently used in criminal cases.

The New Jersey Supreme Court recently issued a pivotal decision in the case of State v. Roberson Burney, a case dealing with complex issues of evidence admissibility and the potential for cumulative error during a trial. The Court ruled that both expert testimony regarding the defendant’s cell phone location based on a “rule of thumb” approximation and a first-time in-court identification of the defendant were inadmissible. The combination of these errors, the Court held, deprived the defendant of a fair trial.

Hudson County Interpreter In a landmark decision, the New Jersey Supreme Court weighed in on a crucial issue of first impression: Must a criminal defendant be provided in-person interpreting services during a jury trial, or will video remote interpreting (VRI) suffice? The case of State v. Juracan-Juracan dives into this question, addressing a major point of contention within the legal community—especially given the significant adjustments courts have had to make in response to the COVID-19 pandemic.

Oscar R. Juracan-Juracan, a native speaker of the Kaqchikel language, was charged with multiple offenses related to alleged sexual assault. Juracan-Juracan requested a Kaqchikel interpreter for his trial, but because the interpreter resided on the West Coast and only spoke Kaqchikel and Spanish, a second interpreter was needed to translate between Spanish and English. The interpreter himself expressed concerns about the effectiveness of remote interpretation during the jury trial. Despite these concerns, the trial court denied the request for in-person interpreting, citing financial constraints among other reasons.

The New Jersey Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s decision and remanded the case for reconsideration. The Court made several crucial points:

Hudson-County-Criminal-Lawyer-rotatedAttorney Stephen Natoli successfully argued before a three-judge panel that his client’s rights had been violated during a 2019 trial handled by prior counsel.  Following the trial, Defendant was sentenced to twenty-three (23) years in prison.  He had been serving his prison sentence when he retained Mr. Natoli for his appeal.

At issue on appeal was whether or not, a testifying detective could narrate a video of the incident and render a lay opinion regarding an ultimate issue in the case: the cause of the car wreck.

Also at issue was whether or not valid waiver of Defendant’s appearance had occurred on the day of a crucial pre-trial testimonial hearing.

Contact Information